MAZARIN’S CONNECTION WITH THE REBELLIONS IN NAPLES AND ENGLAND

      1643-1649

      Italy in 1643—Spain and her decadence—Mazarin’s policy in Italy  Election of Innocent X.—The Tuscan presidii—The siege of Orbitello—Masaniello’s revolt in Naples—Its causes—Death of Masaniello ; rise of Annesi—The French attack on the Milanese—Naples proclaims a Republic—French intervention in Naples—Failure of Guise—Spanish rule restored in Naples —Mazarin’s relations with England—The Great Rebellion— Its importance to France—Mazarin’s policy—The defeats of Charles I.—Mazarin and the Scots—Mission of Belliévre— Failure of Mazarin and Belliévre to understand the position in England—The establishment of the Commonwealth a menace to France.

      When Mazarin succeeded Richelieu, Italy was still a geographical expression. The Spaniards held the kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Tuscan ports, and were supreme in the Milanese. The war of Castro between the papacy and a league of princes—a war the outbreak of which had fatally interfered with Richelieu’s Italian policy—continued, and was not concluded till 1644. Divided, and lacking all national feeling, Italy was destined to remain a prey to intrigue and open to attack till the pertinacity of the house of Savoy was rewarded, and Italy, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, became a nation.

      Mazarin had not been long in office before he determined, in continuance of Richelieu’s policy, to hamper the Spaniards by taking advantage of the chronic discontent in Italy, and to attack either the Milanese or the Tuscan ports. At the same time he took every opportunity during the struggle with Spain to stir up the Neapolitans to revolt. Though the gains to France from Mazarin’s Italian policy were small, none the less there is something to be said for a policy which hampered Spain for many years and occupied large bodies of her troops.

      Spain during the Thirty Years’ War had good reason to regret the policy adopted by Charles V. and his successors at Madrid. Instead of attending to the true interests of their country, the Spanish rulers attempted to rule over the Spanish Netherlands and Italy, and involved themselves in all the dynastic schemes of the Austrian Hapsburgs. The interests of the Spanish population were never considered, and the vast Spanish colonies in America were badly managed. Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the national well-being of Spain was subordinated to dynastic considerations. The Peace of the Pyrenees found Spain in a state of decadence, unable to defend the Spanish Netherlands from attack, with her hold on Italy growing weaker each year, and the vision of an Atlantic empire rapidly passing away. Mazarin rightly concentrated his principal attacks upon the Spanish Netherlands.

      From that quarter Paris was most easily threatened, and the loss of the Low Countries to Spain would be not only serious to her reputation, but would prove an immense gain to France. As a means to that end the intervention of France in Italy, and the constant attempts of the French fleet to dominate the western basin of the Mediterranean, have a special interest.

      In the Milanese, Tuscany, and Naples, Mazarin simply continued the policy of Richelieu, and devoted all his efforts to secure, if not the expulsion from, at any rate the weakening of the hold of the Spaniards upon Italy. But the same influences which checked Richelieu’s attempts to carry out his schemes were at work during Mazarin’s ministry, and till the end of the Spanish Succession War Italy remained dominated by Spain. By the formation of a new Italian League, which should include the Pope, Venice, Florence, Parma, and Modena, Mazarin hoped in 1643 to oust the Spaniards from Milan. But as long as the Spaniards held the Tuscan ports the Grand Duke of Tuscany was unwilling to take any action ; and on the death of Urban VIII. his successor, Innocent X., quarrelled with the French cardinal. Nevertheless, though unable to form a league, Mazarin never ceased to stir up opposition to Spain in Milan, in Tuscany, in Naples, and in Sicily. His agents were to be found in many parts of Italy inciting the Italians to throw off the Spanish yoke and to replace it by national governments. Nothing perhaps illustrates better Mazarin’s tenacity of purpose and patience than the way in which he allowed no obstacles to check, more than temporarily, the execution of the anti-Spanish policy in Italy which he carried on consistently till 1648. On July 29, 1644, Urban VIII. died, and the Spanish party among the cardinals succeeded in carrying their candidate, the Cardinal Panfilio, who was elected in September as Innocent X. Mazarin was furious. The French envoy Saint-Chamand was replaced by Grémonville, who, it was hoped, would successfully counteract Spanish influence at Rome. The task was a difficult one. Innocent X. repelled the French advances and declared himself in sympathy with the Spanish cause. His actions confirmed his words, and Grémonville was recalled.

      Though Mazarin had failed at Rome, he pursued with energy schemes for the overthrow of the Spanish power in Italy, and at once resolved to conquer the Tuscan presidii or ports, and then to proceed to the conquest of Naples itself. The Tuscan ports included Orbitello, Porto Ercole, Porto San Stefano, Telamone, Monte Argentaro, Monte Philippo, and Porto Longone in Elba. Before attacking any of these places, Mazarin fixed upon Prince Thomas of Savoy as the French candidate for the Neapolitan throne. The prince came to Paris, and it was agreed that, in the event of his accession to Naples, he should hand over to France Gaëta and another port on the Adriatic. “ Mistress of the presidii of Tuscany, of Gaëta, and of a port on the Adriatic, and closely allied with the new king of Naples, France would have ruined the Spanish influence in Italy.”1

      These well-prepared plans were destined to be unsuccessful. The French fleet sailed from Toulon on April 26, 1646, and Orbitello, with the help of Prince

      Thomas, was besieged. On June 14 a Spanish fleet attempted to raise the siege, and a naval battle took place. The Spaniards were defeated, but the Duc de Brézé, the French admiral, was killed. This disaster, coupled with the incapacity of Prince Thomas and the unhealthiness of the coast, proved fatal to the success of the French enterprise.

      The siege of Orbitello was raised in July, Prince Thomas abandoned his artillery and returned to Piedmont, and the French fleet retired. Though the French occupied Piombino and Porto Longone, this check to Mazarin’s schemes was, as has been pointed out in the last chapter, at once followed by attacks on his policy. His enemies in Paris gladly seized the opportunity of reviling the minister, and Orleans is reported to have said sarcastically, “Voilà de ses entreprises.”2 At the same time Henry Condé claimed the post of admiral for his son Enghien, who had married the sister of the Duc de Brézé. Mazarin was, however, equal to the task of resisting the attacks on himself and the claims of the house of Condé. By his advice Anne of Austria reserved to the crown the right of appointing the admiral; while Mazarin, whose check at Orbitello had been compensated for by the capture of Dunkirk on October 11,1646, prepared to carry out the second portion of his Italian scheme, and, while making a fresh attack upon the Tuscan ports, to take advantage of a revolt which had broken out against the Spanish rule in Naples.

      During the year 1646 Mazarin had fully realised the necessity for carrying on the war vigorously against Spain. The Dutch, fearful, since the fate of Dunkirk,  of a complete French conquest of the Spanish Netherlands, had shown a tendency to ally with Spain. Mazarin consequently made great efforts to draw closer the bonds which united France and Sweden. The latter country, ruled by the eccentric Queen Christina, was still animated by hatred of the Hapsburgs, and the French cardinal had little difficulty in strengthening the alliance between the courts of Paris and Stockholm. Sure of the Swedish alliance, he decided to avenge the check received by the French forces at Orbitello, and, if possible, force Spain to make peace, by again attacking the Spaniards in Italy. The capture of Piombino and Porto Longone had been effected in the autumn of 1646, and while, early in 1647, Enghien (now, on the death of his father in December 1646, the Prince of Condé) proceeded to Lérida, Mazarin found in the Neapolitan revolt an opportunity for still further harassing Spain.

      Naples, which the Spanish descendants of Charles V. held, was regarded by them as a valuable treasury. A Neapolitan parliament, indeed, existed, composed of the nobles and people ; but, in spite of repeated promises, the Spanish viceroys rarely, if ever, summoned it. In 1647 the viceroy, the Duke of Arcos, having already taxed most of the necessaries of life, laid a fresh tax upon fruit. A revolt was the immediate result. This revolt was in its early stages no movement for liberty and independence, it was simply directed against the tax on fruit. Under a fisherman called Masaniello the Neapolitans forced the Duke of Arcos to fly to the castle of St. Elmo, while in Palermo an attack was simultaneously made...