TSR2 (eBook)

CHAPTER ONE

Beginnings

In September 1951, with the Canberra shortly due to reach RAF squadrons in quantity, the RAF’s Directorate of Operational Requirements (DOR) began looking at the prospects for a new light bomber to replace the Canberra in due course. It has traditionally been the case that the RAF has always looked ahead for a replacement type as soon as possible after the existing type has begun to enter service (sometimes even before that milestone was reached). Air Commodore H.V. Satterly at DOR started the ball rolling with a Minute to his staff at the Directorate, asking them start thinking about policy for the Canberra replacement. In it he pointed out that the RAF’s Aircraft Research Committee had already begun a study on the pros and cons of a low-altitude bomber, though current policy was that bombers had to be able to evade or fight their way through defences, and the low-altitude bomber concept was designed to evade only.

A paper entitled ‘An Appreciation on the Requirement for a Future Light Bomber’ was produced in July 1952. It laid out the need for a light bomber with a primary role of the delivery of atomic weapons; with the highest performance possible, particularly at low altitude; and the capability to be adapted to secondary roles without compromising its primary role. This was the first real hint of what was to become the TSR2. The paper specifically referred to replacing the Canberra, ‘now in Service and already to some extent technically obsolete’, with the new aircraft expected to be in service by 1958 and having a useful front-line life of about four years, until 1962. The RAF mindset at the time was still stuck in the 1940s, when an aircraft type’s useful life was sometimes measured in months rather than years; certainly never in decades.

The English Electric Canberra. The RAF expected the type to be obsolete by 1965 and completely worn out by 1970. This is B.2 WK163, which set a world altitude record in August 1957 with the aid of a Napier Double Scorpion rocket engine. This aircraft had a varied trials career, including linescan development work, before being finally retired, still not worn out, in the 1990s. It began a civilian career as G-BVWC in 1994 with Classic Aviation Projects, and is seen here being displayed at Duxford in 2008 just before being grounded by lack of suitable replacement Avon 109 engines. Damien Burke

Some of the more interesting aspects of the paper included an appreciation that, when it came to carrying small atomic bombs, the ‘best bomber for any task is broadly the smallest and cheapest that is capable of the required range and accuracy’, and that surface-to-surface guided weapons, or ‘expendable bombers’, could well fulfil the primary role, though accuracy and the attack of fleeting targets would be a challenge. Attacking moving targets and targets of opportunity would not be possible for an unmanned system of any kind, and even the best blind bombing system would also be unsuitable for this kind of task, which would demand visual bombing. Visual bombing accuracy depended greatly on going in at low altitude, and as high-altitude operation was also no longer a means of protection from fighter attack, it was clear which way the wind was blowing. As for weapons carriage, guided bombs would demand control surfaces and economy would demand a small fuselage, so external carriage rather than an internal bomb bay was expected to be the result.

By March 1953 a draft Operational Requirement (OR) had begun to be worked on, based on the Future Light Bomber paper, which blithely (and, as it transpired, inaccurately) declared that the Canberra ‘is rapidly becoming outdated and has no potentialities for further important development’. Clearly the writer of that requirement did not expect the Canberra to be in RAF service more than fifty years later (albeit purely in the reconnaissance role). The draft requirement called for a new aircraft capable of striking up to 500nm (575 miles; 925km) behind the enemy front line, in all weathers, day or night, with priority given to low-level performance, and relying on speed, routeing and manoeuvrability to protect it from enemy defences, as no defensive armament was to be carried (by this point, evade or fight had become simply evade). A cruising speed of 600kt/690mph/ Mach 0.9 was needed, with supersonic bursts of Mach 1.4, and runways of 2,000yd (1,850m) length should be adequate, including pierced steel planking (PSP) or similar improvized surfaces. For 1953 this was all pretty advanced stuff, but the RAF’s dated mindset still showed in other aspects of the draft requirement. These included references to the navigator being provided with a crash station should his normal position be unsuitable; the provision of Gee Mark 3 in the radio fit for the marshalling of bomber streams; and armour to protect against cannon attack from below (as per the Schräge Musik upward firing night-fighter cannon used by the Luftwaffe in World War Two). Weapons were to include four 30mm cannon and various items fit for particular roles, e.g. Blue Jay (Firestreak) missiles for the intruder role, rockets and bombs for interdiction or Pentane torpedoes for anti-shipping strike. Production was to begin in 1958, and the aircraft needing to be in squadron service by 1959 at the latest, when the Canberra was expected to be on its last legs.

Coincidentally, in January 1953, as part of development work for an improved Gloster Javelin fighter (the ‘Developed Javelin’) which was being designed to satisfy Specification F.153D, Glosters had submitted a proposal to use a variant of this new ‘thin-wing’ Javelin as a light strike aircraft, and this attracted a great deal of Air Staff interest. By July 1955 OR.328 had been drafted around Gloster’s bomber-Javelin proposals, the broad intention of which was to provide a bomber capable of delivering a tactical nuclear weapon (to OR.1127, the requirement that would result in the atomic bomb later known as Red Beard) in the face of modern air defences, at long range (the target was to be up to 1,000nm (1,150 miles, 1850km) away from base, twice as far as the early drafts of the Canberra replacement requirement), in adverse weather by day or by night. Deletion of fighter equipment such as the huge radar and wing guns would enable the carriage of an extra 2,600gal (11,820L) of fuel (for a total of 4,000gal (18,185L) and the fitting of Bristol Siddeley Olympus 6 engines. A single tactical nuclear bomb would be carried externally, slung under one of the wings, with a drop tank balancing it on the other side and further drop tanks under the fuselage. The in-service date was still required to be 1959.

Simultaneously, work was under way to see what, if anything, could be done to upgrade the Canberra, concentrating on the addition of a blind-bombing system so that the type would have much improved tactical capability at night and in bad weather. However, as the RAF fully expected the type to be out of service in less than a decade, it looked like any serious effort to upgrade it would be wasted, as any sufficiently advanced blind-bombing system would take so long to develop that the aircraft would be nearing retirement by the time it was available. Development of the Bomber/Interdictor versions of the Canberra was rushed through as a stopgap measure, the definitive B(I).8 version entering service in RAF Germany with American ‘Project E’ atomic weapons during 1957.

Unfortunately for Gloster it also soon became clear that the company could not get its thin-wing Javelin bomber into service until 1961. Moreover, a variety of problems, such as dealing with low-level flying and its effect on fatigue life, crew comfort and equipment reliability, had not been fully addressed in Gloster’s proposal. The firm considered that an aircraft with an all-up-weight of 70,000lb (31,750kg) and carrying 4,000gal (18,185L) of fuel would only be able to manage a radius of action of 1,000nm (1,150 miles, 1850km) if most of the flight was to be at high level, and any improvement would entail a complete redesign. As OR.328 required a combat radius of at least 1,000 miles, mostly flown at low level, the bomber version of the thin-wing Javelin did not get far. The Defence Research Policy Committee recommended cancellation of the requirement in late 1955, and when the Chiefs of the Air Staff met in March 1956 they accepted the recommendation. On 11 April 1956 OR.328 was formally cancelled.

The procurement process

The usual process of procuring a military aircraft for the RAF began in the Air Ministry, where the Air Staff (RAF officers) would begin formulating a rough requirement. The result would be an Air Staff Target (AST), which gave a broad outline of what they were after and formed the basis for feasibility studies at industry level, usually submitted in the form of detailed brochures. Assuming these found that the target was a practical and viable proposition, the next step would be to formulate a more detailed Air Staff Requirement (ASR, also often referred to as an Operational Requirement or OR) and award a project study contract to a single firm. The aim of this study was to make an extremely thorough and detailed investigation of the scientific and technical problems involved, and produce a detailed development plan including estimates of cost, timescale and manpower requirements. Assuming this study was approved by all concerned in the Air Ministry (the Air Staff, Operational Requirements department and so on) and Ministry of Supply (MoS, the ministry responsible for the procurement of military aircraft,...