The Realism-Antirealism Debate in the Age of Alternative Logics (eBook)

Preface.- Acknowledgements.- List of Contributors.- Contents.- On When a Disjunction is Informative; Patrick Allo.- 1. Pluralism about Consequence and Content.- 2. Situated and Worldly Content.- 3. Factual and Constraining Content.- 4. Modelling Content.- 5. Three Objections Revisited.- References.- My own truth; Alexandre Billon.- 1. Introduction.- 2. The Truth-Teller is context-sensitive.- 3. The Truth-Teller is relative.- 4. Other pathologies of self-reference.- 4.1 The Liar.- 4.2 Other semantic pathologies.- 4.3 Immunity to revenge problems.- 5. Dissolutions, cassations and resolutions.- References.- Which Logic for the Radical Anti-Realist?; Denis Bonnay; Mikail Cozic.- 1. Introduction.- 2. From anti-realism to substructural logic.- 3. Life without structural rules.- 4.The anti-realist justification of substructural logic.- 5. A way out for radical anti-realism?.- 6. Conclusion.- References.- Moore’s Paradox as an argument against anti-realism; Jon Cogburn.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Moorean validity and proof theoretic semantics.- 3. On the inadvisability of biting the bullet.- 4. A new restriction strategy.- 5. Is antirealism a Moorean Validity? Reflections on Fitch’s proof and Dummett’s program.- 6. Further reflections on Fitch’s proof.- 7. Berkeley and Davidson’s use of Moorean validities.-References.- The Neutrality of Truth in the debate Realism vs. Anti-Realism; Maria J. Frapolli.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Truth.- 3. Realism and Antirealism.- 4. The prosentential view.- 5. The syntactic function of the truth predicate.- 6.The pragmatic function of the truth predicate.- 7. Epistemology and metaphysics.- References.- Modalities without worlds; Reinhard Kahle.- 1. Modal logic.- 2. Possible Worlds Semantics.- 3. The role of semantics.- 4. Criticism of modal logic .- 5. An alternative analysis of modalities: Possibility.- 5.1 Possibility as independence.- 5.2 Epistemic possibility.- 5.3 The future.- 5.4 Ontological modesty.- 5.5  A cross check.- 6. An alternative analysis of modalities: Necessity.- 6.1 Necessity as binary relation.- 6.2 Variety of alternatives.- 6.3 Unary necessity.- 6.4 The normative nature of unary necessity.- 7. The temporal aspect.- 7.1 The dynamics of the axiom system.- 7.2 Nested modalities.- 8. Conclusion.- References.-  Antirealism, meaning and truth-conditional semantics; Neil Kennedy.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Dummett’s antirealism.- 3. Harmony and classical logic.- 4. Antirealist meaning and holism.- 5. The disputed class.- 6. The obtaining of Truth conditions.- 7. By way of conclusion.- References.- Game Semantics and the Manifestation Thesis; Mathieu Marion.- 1. Rethinking the Anti-Realist Challenge.- 2. Towards a Renewal.- 3. The the Manifestation Argument and the Manifestation Thesis.- 4. Concluding Remarks.- References.- Conservativeness and Eliminability for Anti-Realistic Definitions; Francesca Poggiolesi.- 1. Realistic Conservativeness and Eliminability.- 2. Anti-Realistic Definitions and Sequent Calculus.- 3. Anti-realistic Conservativeness.- 4. Anti-Realistic Eliminability.- 5. Logical Variant of the Sequent Calculus.- 6. The Modal Case.- 7. Anti-realistic definitions in past attempts..- References.- Realism, Antirealism, and Paraconsistency; Graham Priest.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Classical vs Intuitionist Logic.- 3. The Logic of Constructible Negation.- 4.Paraconsistency.- 5. Quantified Intuitionist Logic.- 6. Quantified Logics of Constructible Negation.- 7. Conclusion.-  References.- Type-theoretical Dynamics; Giuseppe Primiero.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Conditions for type-theoretical Dynamics.-  3. Belief Revision.- 4. Belief Merging.- 5. Some Remarks.- 5.1 Admitting Beliefs.- 5.2 Degrees of Belief.- References.- Negation in the Logic of First Degree Entailment and Tonk: A Dialogical Study; Shahid Rahman.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Dialogical Logic and Meaning.- 2.1 Local Meaning.- 2.2 Global Meaning.- 2.3 Play level, Strategic Level and Tonk-like-Operators.- 3. The Dialogical Meaning of Negation and the Logic of First Degree Entailment.- The Logic of First-Degree Entailment.- 3.1 Hintikka’s Trees for Enquiry Games and FDE-Negation.- 3.2 Micheal Dunn’s relational semantics for FDE.- 3.3 A Dialogical Study of FDE-Negation.- Switch of Choices. Is Duality-Negation a Tonk-Like Operator?.- Dual Negation and Dual Dialogical-Contexts.- The conditional in Dual Contexts.- Appendices.- Appendix 1. Note on symmetric and asymmetric versions of the E-Rule.- Appendix 2. The disjunctive property and the symmetric rule for intuitionistic logic.- Appendix 3. Examples.- Appendix 4. Soundness and completeness of Hintikka-trees* for Enquiry Games in relation to M. Dunn’s relational semantics for FDE.- References.- Necessary Truth and Proof; Stephen Read.- 1. Truthmaker Realism.- 2. Incompleteness.- 3. Anti-realism.- 4. Logical Pluralism.- 5. Contingency.- References.- Anti-Realist Classical Logic and Realist Mathematics; Greg Restall.- 1. Introduction.- 2. Logic.- 3. Mathematical Practice and Mathematical Theories.- 4. Consequences of the View.- 5. Miscellaneous Concluding Remarks.-  References.- A Tale of two Anti-Realisms; Sanford Shieh.- 1. Epistemological Anti-Realism.- 2. The Bivalence Argument.- 3. Conceptual Anti-Realism.- 4. The Rejection of the Bivalence Argument.- 5. Proof-Theoretic Validity.- References.- A Double Diamond of Judgement; Goran Sundholm.- 1. Introduction.- 2.Judgement and inference: the traditional picture.- 3. The great Bohemian: unary judgement.- 4. Brentano and an alternative unary approach.- 5. Frege’s judgement: truth applied to function/argument structure.- 6. Cambridge truth-making.- 7. Constructivist alternative: Proofs of propositions.- References.- Stable Philosophical Systems and Radical Anti-Realism; Joseph Vidal-Rosset..- 1. Philosophical systems and philosophy of logic.- 1.1 Vuillemin’s classification.- 1.2 What is a stable philosophical system?.- 2. A case of philosophical dispute: Strict Finitism vs.Intuitionism.- 2.1 The contemporary strict finitist argument.- 2.2 Linear Logic and Radical Anti-Realism.- 2.3 The feasibility criteria: polynomial time computability.- 3. Conclusion: laziness or heroism?.- References.- Two Diamonds Are More Than One; Elia Zardini.- 1. Introduction and Overview.- 2. The Paradox of Knowability and the Restriction Strategy.- 3. A New Threat of Collapse of Feasible Knowability on Actual Knowledge.- 4.Transitivity, Factivity, and the Relativity of Accessibility.- 5. Epistemic Possibility of Knowledge and Feasible Knowability.- 6. Conclusion.- References.-