Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise - Hilary Kornblith

Second Thoughts and the Epistemological Enterprise

Buch | Softcover
274 Seiten
2021
Cambridge University Press (Verlag)
978-1-108-72412-8 (ISBN)
38,65 inkl. MwSt
Collected essays showing how social psychology illuminates epistemological problems, focusing on issues of self-knowledge and the nature of human reason. The book features specific examples of sceptical problems and also includes two entirely new essays. It will appeal to pyschologists as well philosophers.
What happens when we have second thoughts about the epistemic standing of our beliefs, when we stop to check on beliefs which we have already formed or hypotheses which we have under consideration? In the essays collected in this volume, Hilary Kornblith considers this and other questions about self-knowledge and the nature of human reason. The essays draw extensively on work in social psychology to illuminate traditional epistemological issues: in contrast with traditional Cartesian approaches to these issues, Kornblith engages with empirically motivated skeptical problems, and shows how they may be constructively addressed in practical and theoretical terms. As well as bringing together ten previously published essays, the volume contains two entirely new pieces that engage with ideas of self and rational nature. Kornblith's approach lays the foundations for further development in epistemology that will benefit from advances in our understanding of human psychology.

Hilary Kornblith is Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. He has written widely on topics in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and related areas, and is the author of Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground (1995), Knowledge and Its Place in Nature (2002), On Reflection (2012), and A Naturalistic Epistemology: Selected Papers (2014).

Introduction; 1. Introspection and misdirection; 2. What is it like to be me?; 3. Distrusting reason; 4. The impurity of reason; 5. What reflective endorsement cannot do; 6. Belief in the face of controversy; 7. Naturalism vs. the first-person perspective; 8. Is there room for armchair theorizing in epistemology?; 9. The role of reasons in epistemology; 10. Doxastic justification is fundamental; 11. Our sense of self; 12. Our rational nature; Index.

Erscheinungsdatum
Zusatzinfo Worked examples or Exercises
Verlagsort Cambridge
Sprache englisch
Maße 152 x 228 mm
Gewicht 406 g
Themenwelt Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Erkenntnistheorie / Wissenschaftstheorie
Geisteswissenschaften Philosophie Metaphysik / Ontologie
ISBN-10 1-108-72412-4 / 1108724124
ISBN-13 978-1-108-72412-8 / 9781108724128
Zustand Neuware
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