Epistemic Values

Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski is Kingfisher College Chair of the Philosophy of Religion and Ethics and George Lynn Cross Research Professor at the University of Oklahoma. She has written seven previous books, including Virtues of the Mind (1996), a landmark in virtue epistemology, and more recently Epistemic Authority (2012) and Exemplarist Moral Theory (2017). She has held a Guggenheim fellowship and fellowships from the NEH, the Templeton Foundation, and the Lilly Foundation, and has given more than two dozen named lectures, including the Gifford Lectures (St. Andrews, Scotland), the Wilde Lectures (Oxford), the Soochow Lectures (Taiwan), the Romanell Lectures of Phi Beta Kappa, and the Dewey Lecture for the American Philosophical Association Central Division. She has authored over a hundred papers. Her works have been translated into 12 languages.

Introduction

I. Knowledge and understanding
1. What is Knowledge?
2. Must Knowers Be Agents?
3. Recovering Understanding
4. Towards a Theory of Understanding

II. Intellectual Virtue
5. Intellectual Virtues: Admirable Traits of Character
6. Trust
7. Intellectual Virtue Terms and the Division of Linguistic Labor

III. Epistemic Value
8. From Reliabilism to Virtue Epistemology
9. The Search for the Source of Epistemic Good
10. Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth
11. Epistemic Value and the Primacy of What We Care About

IV. Virtue in Religious Epistemology
12. Religious Knowledge and the Virtues of the Mind
13. Phronesis and Religious Belief
14. Religious Trust, Anti-trust, and Reasons for Religious Belief

V. Intellectual Autonomy and Authority
15. Ethical and Epistemic Egoism and the Ideal of Autonomy
16. A Defense of Epistemic Authority
17. Intellectual Autonomy

VI. Skepticism and the Gettier Problem
18. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems
19. First Person and Third Person Reasons and the Regress Problem
20. The Moral Transcendental Argument Against Skepticism