The Soul-Body Problem at Paris, ca. 1200–1250

Magdalena Bieniak holds a PhD in Philosophy (University of Padua and University of Paris IV - Sorbonne). She holds a research fellowship at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Padua and is affiliated with the University of Warsaw.

Acknowledgements

Introduction

Part One
Towards the unity of the Human Being
1.1 Accidental union of the soul with the body and unibilitas substantialis of the human soul
1.1.1 The accidental union of the soul with the body
1.1.1.1 Avicenna and early Avicennianism
1.1.1.2 Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono
1.1.2 The unibilitas substantialis of the human soul: Hugh of St-Cher and his contemporaries
1.1.2.1 William of Auxerre
1.1.2.2 Hugh of St-Cher's question De anima
1.1.2.3 Roland of Cremona
1.1.2.4 William of Auvergne
1.1.3 Unibilitas substantialis after Hugh of St-Cher
1.1.3.1 John of La Rochelle
1.1.3.2 Albert the Great
1.1.3.3 Bonaventure
1.1.3.4 Thomas Aquinas
1.2 The human soul and the concept of person
1.2.1 "The human soul is not a person". The Sentences Commentary of Hugh of St-Cher
1.2.2 Evolution of expressions
1.2.2.1 Gilbert of Poitiers
1.2.2.2 Pseudo-Peter of Poitiers and Simon of Tournai
1.2.2.3 Alan of Lille
1.2.2.4 Stephen Langton
1.2.2.5 William of Auxerre
1.2.2.6 Hugh of St-Cher
1.2.3 "The separated soul is not a person". Controversies and misunderstandings
1.2.3.1 From the question of universals to the individuality of the soul: Gilbert of Poitiers
1.2.3.2 Simon of Tournai
1.2.3.3 From logic to psychology: Alan of Lille
1.2.3.4 Stephen Langton
1.2.3.5 William of Auxerre
1.2.3.6 Hugh of St-Cher
1.2.3.7 Alexander of Hales
1.2.3.8 Philip the Chancellor
1.2.3.9 From the Summa Halesiana to Thomas Aquinas's Scriptum in Sententias

Part Two
Between Soul and Body: the Powers of the Soul
Introduction
2.1 The Rational Powers: the Soul as Image of the Trinity
2.1.1 Two Traditions, Two Types of Powers
2.1.2 The identity of the soul with its powers
2.1.2.1 The Augustinian and Pseudo-Augustinian heritage
2.1.2.2 William of Auxerre
2.1.2.3 Hugh of St-Cher
2.1.2.4 An anonymous question (ms. Douai 434, n. 115)
2.1.2.5 Philip the Chancellor and Alexander of Hales
2.1.2.6 Peter of Bar
2.2 The Sensitive and Vegetative Powers
2.2.1 The Union per medium
2.2.1.1 Philip the Chancellor
2.2.1.2 Sources of the doctrine of intermediaries
2.2.1.3 Hugh of St-Cher
2.2.2 The Survival of the Sensitive and Vegetative Powers
2.2.2.1 Hugh of St-Cher
2.2.2.2 Avicenna and Dominicus Gundissalinus
2.2.2.3 Quaestiones antequam esset frater
2.2.2.4 Peter of Bar
2.2.2.5 William of Auvergne
2.3 The Problem of Memory
2.3.1 Two traditions, two types of memory
2.3.2 Philip the Chancellor
2.3.3 The Summa Duacensis
2.3.4 The disputed questions of Peter of Bar
2.3.5 The Gloss of Alexander of Hales
2.3.6 John of La Rochelle
2.3.7 William of Auvergne's De anima: memory, the immortality of the soul and the resurrection

Conclusion

Appendix : Text Editions

Introduction
(A) The disputed questions (Douai 434)
(B) Hugh of St-Cher's Sentences Commentary (I, 3)
(C) Abbreviations

Texts
(A) Hugo de Sancto Caro
(B) Hugo de Sancto Caro
(C)
(D) Anonimi Si anima est sue potentie
(E) Petrus de Barro De hiis que ex parte anime manebunt
(F) Anonimi

Bibliography
(A) Journals and Series
(B) Manuscripts
(C) Edited Sources
(D) Studies

Indices